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Fenster: Substantive Due Process by Another Name

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS BY ANOTHER NAME:
KOONTZ, EXACTIONS, AND THE REGULATORY TAKINGS
DOCTRINE
Mark Fenster
In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,1 a 54 majority of the United States Supreme Court reversed a state court
decision that had limited the application of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission2 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.3 Nollan and Dolan concern the imposition of regulatory conditions on proposed development, also called exactions, which commonly occurs in land use
regulation. In Koontz, a property owner challenged a regulatory
agency’s denial of his permit application following failed negotiations over exactions.4 The Florida Supreme Court had concluded that
Nollan and Dolan did not extend to conditions that the agency had
not officially approved and applied to the owner’s property, nor did
they extend to conditions that imposed fees on property owners.5 The
United States Supreme Court reversed both conclusions, holding that
Nollan and Dolan’s heightened scrutiny, which reviews exactions for
their “rough proportionality”6 and “nexus”7 to the proposed development, can apply in both contexts.8
Unsurprisingly, in a public law doctrine as contested as regulatory takings, the initial responses to the decision, on blogs and in
one early article, are fairly predictable—those sympathetic with government defendants or critical of the Court’s occasional efforts to ex

Levin College of Law, University of Florida.
1
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
2
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
3
512 U.S. 374 (1994).
4
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592-93.
5
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2011), rev’d,
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
6
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
7
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
8
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591.

403

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 [2014], Art. 11

404

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

pand federal constitutional property rights disdain it,9 while those
committed to robust constitutional property rights have embraced it.10
I suggest in this brief essay that we might best understand Koontz not
as signaling a new direction in regulatory takings law, but as solidifying the Court’s exactions jurisprudence as one of its curious carveouts from the Penn Central test11—the deferential test that the Court
firmly ensconced as the default approach to regulatory takings claims
in the most recent chapter of the doctrine’s last half-century.12
Koontz, I argue, completes the move that the Court’s 2005 decision in
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.13 began, rendering the exactions decisions in Nollan, Dolan, and now Koontz, as conceptually and practically outside of the federal constitutional takings realm entirely, and
existing in the astral realm, known as unconstitutional conditions.
There, the exactions tests for nexus and proportionality can float free
from the textual and remedial constraints that the Fifth Amendment,
at least nominally, imposes on the regulatory takings doctrine. From
that distant point, Nollan and Dolan should have little effect on the
core regulatory takings tests—but they will, now, after Koontz, cause
some considerable challenges for state and lower federal courts, especially when they must fashion a remedy besides the just compensation that the Fifth Amendment requires for a taking. In a brief final
conclusion, I suggest that we cannot know the effects that Koontz will
have on land use regulation, although we can expect that they will
vary across jurisdictions and, like Nollan and Dolan, will, in some instances lead to more regulation and in others, lead to less.
9

See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22.1
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2014); Rick Hills, Koontz’s Unintelligible Takings Rule:
Can Remedial Equivocation save the Court from a Doctrinal Quagmire?, PRAWFSBLAWG
(June 25, 2013, 3:41 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/koontzsunintelligible-takings-rule-can-remedial-equivocation-make-up-for-an-incoherentsubstantive-.html.
10
See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional
Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 215, 228 (2012-2013); Richard Epstein, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District: Of Issues Resolved–and Shoved under the Table, POINTOFLAW.COM (June 26, 2013,
1:07 PM), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2013/06/koontz-v-st-johns-river-watermanagement-district-of-issues-resolved--and-shoved-under-the-table.php.
11
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (establishing ad hoc balancing test for regulatory takings doctrine).
12
See generally Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Regulating Land Use] (discussing the Takings Doctrine).
13
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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KOONTZ’S ANTI-COERCION PRINCIPLE

To boil the facts in Koontz down to their essence, the petitioner (“Koontz”) approached the government agency (St. Johns Water
Management District, or “District”) that regulates water resources in
the region where Koontz’s property was located to obtain a permit
that was necessary for him to develop his property.14 The District,
with permitting authority delegated to it by the state, discussed with
Koontz various potential mitigation schemes for the expected effects
of his development.15 Koontz did not agree with the District’s proposals and made proposals of his own, which the District rejected.16
Lacking any acceptable mitigation, Koontz’s permit application was
denied by the District.17 He filed suit alleging, among other things,
that the denial effected a taking of his property for which he was
owed compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.18
A majority of the Florida Supreme Court, unanimously reversing
lower state courts, held that Koontz’s claim could not benefit from
the heightened scrutiny afforded by Nollan and Dolan, with the majority concluding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply both because no
mitigation measures were imposed and because the mitigation
measures were fees rather than land.19
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.20 The five-justice majority’s main concern was with what it characterized as the coercive nature of the land use regulatory process to which the property owner
had been subjected.21 The decision’s opening paragraph made plain
its distaste for the kind of discretionary authority that the District
wielded, characterizing Nollan and Dolan in its first sentence as
providing “important protection against the misuse of the power of
land-use regulation” and then describing, in its brief summary of the
case, the District’s condition as a requirement to “surrender” a property interest and the property owner’s response as a “refus[al] to
yield.”22 Property owners, the Court explained, are always potential14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.
Id. at 2593.
Id. at 2592-93.
Id. at 2593.
Id. at 2591, 2593.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593-94.
Id. at 2594.
Id. at 2594-95.
Id. at 2591.
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ly at risk of coercion in the land use permitting process:
[T]he government often has broad discretion to deny a
permit that is worth far more than property it would
like to take. By conditioning a building permit on the
owner’s deeding over a public right-of-way, for example, the government can pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just compensation. . . .
Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate the Fifth
Amendment right to just compensation, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.23
More than even its strong statement in Lingle, situating Nollan and Dolan as takings decisions with a foot also in the unconstitutional takings doctrine,24 the Court in Koontz appeared, at first glance,
to situate the constitutional review of land use conditions only partially in the Takings Clause.25 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
the Court noted, vindicates disparate individual rights, including the
right to free speech under the First Amendment, as well as the constitutional right to travel.26 The doctrine’s application to the Takings
Clause is “special,” however, because the conditions may be permissible without liability for a taking if they mitigate the costs created by
the approved land uses to which the conditions are attached.27
Though its application may be “special,” the doctrine must operate in
this context because of the government’s coercive power to impose
excessive demands that bear little relationship, in quantity and quality, to the proposed land use.28 Hence, Nollan and Dolan established
the “rough proportionality” (quantitative) and “nexus” (qualitative)
tests to protect against the state’s unequal bargaining power to enforce constitutional limits on conditions that are insufficiently related
and are, therefore, likely to be coercive.29
23

Id. at 2594-95.
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547 (delineating the explicit linkage between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the exactions decision begun in Dolan); see also Dolan, 512
U.S. at 385 (discussing this relationship).
25
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95.
26
Id. at 2594 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974)). See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969)
(stating that the right to travel has no clear textual source in the Constitution).
27
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95.
28
Id. at 2594.
29
Id. at 2594-95.
24
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Having explained the doctrine’s singular focus on checking
government coercion, the Court held that there was no material distinction between the factual differences at play in the regulatory conditions in Koontz—threatened conditions rather than imposed conditions, and money exactions, rather than real property dedications—
and those in Nollan and Dolan, which addressed regulatory approvals
with attached conditions that required dedications of real property interests.30 The Court could deploy the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine’s trans-substantive status as “an overarching principle” in
order to “vindicate[] the Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into giving them up.”31
Coercion is coercion, no matter if the state has yet to impose any
formal conditions as part of its issuance of an official approval, and
no matter if the as-yet imposed condition is an interest in real property or the money from a fee tied to an interest in real property. 32 Taking a legal realist perspective on what it viewed as meaningless formal distinctions, the Court pierced the veil of this class of
government actions to find the coercive character lurking within.33
The Court faced three significant issues in applying Nollan
and Dolan to the facts in Koontz, each of which arises from the challenge of applying the Takings Clause to land use exactions. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine’s freestanding status allowed the
Court to overcome each issue, at least to its satisfaction if not to the
dissent’s.34 The first issue was the District’s credible argument that
monetary fees are somehow different from real property exactions
and are not, therefore, “property” cognizable under the Takings
Clause.35 In response, the Koontz majority answered that money exactions can be property because the conditional fees that the District
allegedly sought to impose were tied to Koontz’s application to develop his property.36 Under this logic, fees fall squarely within the
otherwise confusing precedent regarding the taking of money.37
Equally significant, however, the Court noted that the unconstitution-

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id. at 2590, 2595-96.
Id. at 2594.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595-96.
Id.
Id. at 2594.
Id.
Id. at 2599.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600.
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al conditions doctrine could not allow a government entity to enjoy a
lower level of scrutiny for its exactions simply by shifting its demands from real property to money.38 To allow the government to do
so would simply enable it to abuse its regulatory authority—precisely
the wrongdoing that the doctrine is intended to prevent.39
The second and third issues were related. The second was the
absence of an actual taking in Koontz, since, as all nine justices
agreed, the District took no constitutionally cognizable property.40
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine allowed the majority to hold
that Koontz need not have shown the actual loss of property to state a
Nollan and Dolan claim:
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use
permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not
because they take property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken
without just compensation. As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to
cede a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury.41
The demand for property, combined with the denial of a permit rather
than an actual taking, constituted an injury because the District allegedly based its decision on Koontz’s refusal to accede to an illegally
coercive demand.42
Third, the Court faced the argument that a regulatory act in
which no property is taken cannot serve as the basis for a takings
claim because the Takings Clause’s sole and required remedy for a
violation, just compensation, could not apply.43 Reframing the issue,
the Court stated that a remedy for a violation of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, rather than for a violation of the Takings Clause,
would be available under state law, and remanded the case to the

38

Id. at 2599.
Id.
40
Id. at 2597 (characterizing Koontz as a case of “an excessive demand but no taking”);
id. at 2612 (“In what legal universe could a law authorizing damages only for a ‘taking’ also
provide damages when (as all agree) no taking has occurred?”) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
41
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
42
Id. at 2593, 2596.
43
Id. at 2611-12 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
39
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Florida Supreme Court to consider the appropriate remedy. 44 The
Takings Clause thus served neither as the legal basis for Koontz’s
claim, nor did it provide the remedy.
In responding to all three counter-arguments, the Court explained that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its broad anti-coercion principle could at once resolve and even transcend any
formalist concerns about takings doctrine and the Fifth Amendment’s
text.45 Justice Alito’s decision in Koontz thus made two basic moves.
First, it identified and described a class of regulatory acts that are
symptomatic of programmatic unfairness in the land use regulatory
process that, as such, hold the potential for extortionate government
overreach.46 It then deployed the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
which is tied loosely to the Takings Clause and embodied in the precedent of Nollan and Dolan. The heightened scrutiny of those decisions established the prophylactic protection necessary to prevent
such programmatic unfairness.47
Justice Kagan’s four-justice opinion dissented on both issues,
arguing that Koontz failed to state a cognizable claim under Nollan
and Dolan and that the intermediate scrutiny established in those decisions did not apply to money exactions.48 Some commentators
have incorrectly asserted that her dissent agreed entirely with the majority’s decision that Nollan and Dolan apply in the absence of formal conditions.49 Justice Kagan agreed that heightened scrutiny
could apply to a singular demand the government makes, whether the
permit is approved (in a condition subsequent) or not (and therefore
constitutes a condition precedent).50 But she quite clearly stated that
Nollan and Dolan can only apply when a court finds that “the permit
denial occurred because the government made a demand of the landowner, which he rebuffed,” and that the demand be “unequivocal.”51
The record did not support Koontz’s claim in this regard, the dissent
concluded52—a problem that property owners will frequently face in
Koontz-like cases, because in most such cases they will only have a
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 2597-98.
Id. at 2594.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95.
Id. at 2595.
Id. at 2603-04 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See Somin, supra note 10, at 227-28; Epstein, supra note 10, at 2.
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603-04 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2610.
Id. at 2611.
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claim based on informal discussions and negotiations rather than a
clear, final, formal statement. Requiring a clear, formal demand is
necessary for a Nollan and Dolan claim, Justice Kagan warned, or
else the threat of heightened scrutiny will subsume all discussions between owners and regulatory agencies.53 Moreover, a court will have
no basis for deciding whether and what property had been taken—a
problem that Koontz itself illustrates, as the District had proposed
numerous possible conditions, no one of which clearly emerged in
the record as the single condition rejected by the property owner
which led the government to deny his permit application.54 Although
the dissent agreed with the majority in theory, then, the strict limits
Justice Kagan would place on that theory’s application reveal the four
dissenting justices’ deep misgivings about inviting courts into the
weeds of the regulatory process.55
The dissent’s concerns also extended to the money exactions
issue. Under existing precedent, Justice Kagan argued, fees that impose a general liability were not property whose taking the Fifth
Amendment prohibits without compensation.56 Placing limits on the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine when tied to the Takings Clause,
the dissent stated:
[T]he heightened standard of Nollan and Dolan is not
a freestanding protection for land-use permit applicants; rather, it is “a special application of the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, which provides that the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken”—in exchange for a
land-use permit. As such, Nollan and Dolan apply only if the demand at issue would have violated the Constitution independent of that proposed exchange. Or
put otherwise, those cases apply only if the demand
would have constituted a taking when executed out53

Id. at 2610.
Id. at 2609-10. The Koontz dissent’s concern is consistent with an issue that Justice
Scalia had raised a decade earlier in a dissent from a denial of certiorari in a similar case,
when he questioned whether a taking actually occurs in the absence of an identifiable, formal
condition. See Lambert v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 529 U.S. 1045, 1048 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
56
Id. at 2605-07.
54
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side the permitting process.57
If money is not property that is cognizable under the Takings Clause,
the dissent reasoned, then Nollan and Dolan cannot apply.58
The Koontz dissent thus also made two moves. First, it refused both to characterize the case as one in which the government
imposed an extortionate demand and to view the land use regulatory
process as one marked by widespread coercion.59 Second, it would
have limited the applicability of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine under the Takings Clause to instances in which the state had required a definite condition that resulted in the taking of an identifiable real property interest.60 Put simply, whereas the majority viewed
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a trans-substantive means
to fight the coercive negotiations that are endemic to the area of land
use regulation, the dissent viewed the doctrine as subject to textual
and precedential constraints under the Takings Clause and would
have drawn a much smaller category of formal negotiations that are
subject to Nollan and Dolan. I consider the meaning and significance
of the majority and dissent’s competing visions of exactions and the
most appropriate doctrinal approaches to them in the next part.
II.

KOONTZ, REGULATORY TAKINGS, AND THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE: OR,
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS BY ANOTHER NAME

Capturing a fifth justice, the majority’s understanding of the
case and of the class of regulatory actions prevailed, as did its apparent vision of the relationship between Nollan and Dolan (and now
Koontz) and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. For commentators sympathetic to the Koontz decision it marks a welcome return of
vigorous property rights enforcement in a contested takings case, and
especially applauded is the Court’s explicit acknowledgement of the
need to check government efforts at imposing extortionate demands
on vulnerable property owners.61 The Court’s factual narrative and

57

Id. at 2606-07 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547).
Id. at 2606.
59
Id. at 2608, 2611.
60
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2609 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
61
See Somin, supra note 10, at 241. See also Epstein, supra note 10 (characterizing
Koontz as a “victory of sorts” for property owners because it provides the “second best” protection to property owners who are “held up” by the government).
58
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justification for its decision sound in the classic rights-friendly version of the regulatory takings doctrine—one that views the doctrine
as an essential constitutional means to provide strong protection for
individuals from the state’s use of its police power to take their property in actions that go “too far” (in Justice Holmes’s famous, cryptic
phrase),62 and that “forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole” (as the Armstrong principle declares).63
But this explanation of the Takings Clause is just one among
numerous competing ones that the Court and commentators have developed, and the Court has not been consistent in its reliance on
them.64 The dissent’s concern that Koontz “threatens the heartland of
local land-use regulation and service delivery” and the multitude of
varied state and local approaches to land use regulation65 represents
what I have argued is the most important and oft-cited justification
for denying regulatory takings claims, and one that had found significant purchase in takings decisions over the past decade—the relative
institutional competence of legislative, regulatory, and judicial entities, especially at the state and local level, to decide land use issues.66
62

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See generally Mark Fenster, The
Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property Rights, 9 U.
PA. J. CON. L. 667, 694-706 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Legal Process] (describing the fairness rationale as the most significant and oft-cited justification for constitutional property
rights protection).
64
Another such rationale is the utilitarian concern with the consequences of excessive or
inadequate regulation. Academic property rights advocates have argued that Koontz will not
only protect property owners but that it will promote more efficient regulation by forcing
government entities to internalize the costs they would otherwise shift to property owners
through compensation, see Somin, supra note 10, at 234, and by moving the law incrementally towards having the benefits that the government seeks through a condition match more
precisely the harms that an approved land use creates. See Epstein, supra note 10. Such
consequential conceptions of the Takings Clause as a mechanism for regulatory efficiency
are another set of justifications that the Court and commentators have frequently relied upon
in explaining the Takings Clause. See Fenster, Legal Process, supra note 63, at 706-10. But
as in most takings decisions, see id. at 710-12, the majority in Koontz did not consider such
concerns; instead, its only discussion of cost internalization occurred when it explained that
Nollan and Dolan allow the government to impose conditions without compensating property owners in order to keep property owners from externalizing harms on others. Koontz, 133
S. Ct. at 2595 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
65
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608-10 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66
See Fenster, Legal Process, supra note 63, at 733-39 (articulating this critique on
Koontz). See also Rick Hills, Bill Fischel on Koontz: Why Federalism should limit enforcement of Takings Doctrine, PRAWFSBLAWG, (Aug. 16, 2013, 12:50 PM)
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/08/bill-fischel-on-koontz-why-federalism63
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Lingle doubted the wisdom of allowing open-ended federal constitutional standards to decide the takings issue in the absence of the regulations that are “functionally equivalent” to confiscation.67 By drawing tight limits around the regulatory takings doctrines and especially
around those categories of regulatory effects that receive more than
deferential scrutiny, Lingle appeared to place institutional competence and deference to political and state and local institutions over
the federal constitutional protection of property owners from all but
the worst regulatory unfairness.68
Read superficially with an emphasis on its result, Koontz
would appear to have signaled the reemergence in contested regulatory takings decisions of fairness, rather than institutional competence,
as the Takings Clause’s preeminent function and justification—at
least by the margin of one justice. But did it? In a blog post that appeared soon after Koontz was issued, Richard Epstein, the preeminent
academic property rights advocate and longtime bête noir of those
who seek to narrow the reach of the Takings Clause, lamented that
the decision provided little more than a second best solution to the
state’s systematic overreach in its regulatory actions beyond the limits of common law nuisance.69 Epstein had hoped for a “robust critique of all exactions”; instead, the Court issued a narrow decision
with some beneficial components (from his perspective) that failed to
provide a coherent or even adequate remedy.70 Whereas Ilya Somin,
a libertarian of a younger generation writing in the Cato Institute review of the Supreme Court term, considered the decision a step in the
should-limit-enforcement-of-takings-doctrine.html (quoting an email from William Fischel);
Hills, supra note 9 (critiquing the decision in federalist terms, as an invasion “of subnational
governments’ land-use prerogatives” and a violation of important federalist principles). As I
have argued, federalism constitutes a justification for regulatory takings decisions, particularly when viewed as a check on the Court’s tendency to expand federal constitutional property rights to supersede state property law, see Fenster, Legal Process, supra note 63, at 71922, but it is rarely a core justification upon which the Court relies, see id. at 722-26; Carol
M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1681,
1693-1701 (2007), perhaps in part because those justices who more prominently claim to
uphold federalist values prioritize property rights over the rights of subnational governments
to regulate under the police power. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 726-27 (2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (showing no
hesitation in asserting that federal courts can and may impose takings liability for a state
court’s interpretation of its own property law); but see Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203 (2004).
67
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
68
Id. at 539-40.
69
See Epstein, supra note 10.
70
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 2 [2014], Art. 11

414

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

right direction,71 Epstein yearned for “coherence”—which is to say a
thoroughgoing, muscular approach to property rights protection that
would sweep away the existing approach to the Takings Clause and
make strict judicial scrutiny the rule rather than the exception in challenges to land use and environmental regulation.72
Epstein is right to be disappointed, and one would not need to
look any further than the Court’s incoherent and faint-hearted remedy
to see the decision’s incrementalism. The Fifth Amendment prescribes a remedy for a taking—just compensation—that the Court
could find no way to impose on the District because, it conceded, no
property had in fact been taken from Koontz for which compensation
could be awarded.73 Dodging this textual challenge and seeking to
establish a remedy outside the constitutional text, the Court held that
under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, a property owner like
Koontz can seek a remedy in state law rather than under the federal
constitution.74 Remanding the case back to the lower courts, the
Court suggested that because Koontz brought his takings claim under
state law, he could rely on the state courts to find a remedy under
Florida law, such as a statute allowing the award of damages for a
state agency action that is “an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation.”75 But
the Court provided neither an answer as to whether this or any other
state law could provide a remedy, nor any guidance for future litigants and lower courts as to how to apply such remedies in particular
cases. Instead, it simply remanded the case for the lower courts to
decide on a remedy. This was, as Epstein noted, neither robust nor
coherent.76
The Court’s nebulous remedy not only blunts Koontz’s result,
but also unveils the emergence of a somewhat new vision for the constitutional rules regarding exactions. The relationship between the
Court’s exactions decisions and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine had begun as an implicit logic in Nollan77 and in Dolan, with the
71

See Somin, supra note 10, at 243.
See Epstein, supra note 10.
73
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597 (“While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes
that this burdens a constitutional right, the Fifth Amendment mandates a particular remedy—
just compensation—only for takings.”).
74
Id. at 2595.
75
Id. at 2597-98 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.617).
76
See Epstein, supra note 10.
77
Nollan did not mention the unconstitutional conditions doctrine explicitly, but several
72
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latter, unlike the former, at least providing a brief mention of the doctrine and a string citation to its canonical decisions.78 It was not until
Lingle, when the Court was forced to extricate Nollan and Dolan
from the shadow of substantive due process and the “substantially
advance legitimate state interests” language from Agins v. City of Tiburon,79 that the Court revealed that its exactions decisions were in
fact, a “special application” of the unconstitutional doctrine.80 Because the property owners in Nollan and Dolan suffered the loss of an
interest in an identifiable piece of property, the Court could appropriately invoke just compensation as a remedy.81
Tellingly, when discussing its remand to the Florida Supreme
Court to consider the appropriate state law remedy, the Koontz majority stated: “Whether that provision covers an unconstitutional conditions claim like the one at issue here is a question of state law that the
Florida Supreme Court did not address and on which we will not
opine.”82 Justice Alito’s characterization of Koontz’s claim revealed
the logic of the majority’s decision. Because Koontz concerned the
application of Nollan and Dolan, one must similarly conclude that
those decisions are now not takings decisions either. The entire field
of exactions now, apparently, falls under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine rather than the Takings Clause.
State and lower federal courts could read this decision as thus
widening the scope of judicial remedies to include invalidation or
other measures not available under the Fifth Amendment.83 Recall
the statute to which Justice Alito would refer the Florida Supreme
Court—one that offers a remedy to “an unreasonable exercise of the
state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensa-

commentators viewed it as an implicit authority on which the decision relied. See Vicki
Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 473-75 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1463-64 (1989).
78
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
79
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
80
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
81
See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385-86, 389 (noting compensation as the appropriate remedy); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842 (“[I]f [California] wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it.”).
82
Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597-98 (emphasis added).
83
See id. at 2597 (“Because petitioner brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause of
action, the Court has no occasion to discuss what remedies might be available for a Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional conditions violation either here or in other cases.”).
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tion.”84 That sounds, quite clearly, like the kind of substantive due
process theory that the Court had banished from the Takings Clause
in Lingle. As a matter of remedy, Koontz might work a subtle but
important shift into the judicial review of exactions. Specifically, it
creates an issue going forward regarding the remedy available for a
Nollan and Dolan claim—can a claimant who challenges an approval
with conditions, and not simply the threat of conditions, seek something other than or in addition to just compensation? That is, can
Koontz’s notable characterization of itself as an unconstitutional conditions case shift the entire constitutional exactions doctrine wholly
out of the traditional regulatory takings doctrine? The decision certainly suggests as much.
In terms of the larger picture of regulatory takings law, however, Koontz is likely to have little significance. Despite the hope
among property rights advocates that Dolan’s proportionality logic
and heightened scrutiny would overtake Penn Central’s deferential
multi-factor test,85 the exactions decisions have since operated as narrow carve-outs like the Lucas wipe-out rule86 and the Loretto permanent occupation rule.87 Koontz only further solidifies a status that had
long been recognized in the complex doctrinal mess that is the regulatory takings doctrine. Only practitioners and judges—and, perhaps,
seasoned land use professionals with the patience necessary to overcome their struggle with the doctrine—need understand the subtle
distinctions the Court’s categories make. The regulatory takings doctrine’s technical complexity continues to grow in order to meet the
challenge of providing occasional federal constitutional protection
against the vast multitude of land use regulators and regulations. It is
a convoluted game that few can play but that affects, at least indirectly, everyone. The state of this game is not new, and Koontz has only
added to it despite the decision’s facial appearance as a simple and
fair intervention against coercive regulation on behalf of downtrodden landowners.
Viewing this new wrinkle—that Nollan and Dolan are (now)
really unconstitutional conditions cases—explains a few mysteries,
and further illustrates how Koontz’s influence will be limited. Justice
84

Id. at 2597-98 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617 (2012)).
See Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle,
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1011-12. (1997).
86
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
87
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
85
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Kennedy has come to occupy Justice O’Connor’s former role as the
swing vote in contested takings decisions. He has also expressed repeatedly in separate opinions, most recently in the 2010 decision in
Stop the Beach,88 that he has a particular interest in substituting the
substantive due process doctrine for the regulatory takings doctrine in
cases when the latter is not easily applied.89 Koontz fits that description—property owners facing exploitative government entities may
not lose their property every time they are coerced by excessive conditions, but they do face coercion. The Fifth Amendment’s text does
not easily address this situation, as the Court noted in Lingle,90
demonstrating the need for a trans-substantive doctrine unburdened
by the constitutional text that can provide relief against “arbitrary or
irrational” regulation—like substantive due process.91 But, the
Court’s conservative members either reject substantive due process in
this context,92 or have drawn extremely tight limits around its application.93 Perhaps for Justice Kennedy, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine achieves what he believes substantive due process
would achieve more broadly, while the doctrine offers a far more satisfying solution than substantive due process to the problem of protecting property rights for the other justices.
Viewed this way, Koontz can be little more than a footnote.
Professor Epstein is right—the decision does not augur an imminent
rollback of the regulatory state via a broad constitutional requirement
for compensation.94
III.

CONCLUSION: ANTICIPATING KOONTZ’S EFFECTS WITHOUT
PREDICTING THEM

Will Koontz have influence at all in the quotidian world of
land use and environmental regulation? Making predictions about
the effects of a new, complex Supreme Court decision on the com88

Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 736-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544-45.
91
Id. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 560 U.S. at 721-22 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (rejecting the use of substantive due process doctrine and arguing against its expansion).
93
See United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 401-02
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding that substantive due process test in challenges to land use regulation
is a “shocks-the-conscience” standard).
94
Epstein, supra note 10.
89
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plex and widely varied practices of state, regional, and local land use
regulators is a fool’s errand. Nollan and Dolan’s federal constitutionalization of exactions only presaged the practice’s wide expansion over the past few decades—in other words, the decisions correlated with an expansion of the regulatory practice about which the
Court expressed skepticism, and the expanded use of exactions no
doubt also led to a greater absolute number of abusive conditions that
landowners did not challenge. The Court’s prophylactic rules thus
perversely might have made things worse for some landowners. 95 As
a study published in 2000 of California planners found, land use
regulators have had a mixed reaction to the proportionality and nexus
requirements that Nollan and Dolan announced: planners respected
the tests for expressing good planning principles, and thus presumably incorporated them into their practice, which itself expanded with
the real estate boom of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries; and planners feared the climate of enhanced judicial review that
the Supreme Court seemed to have ushered in, and are cautious and
more bureaucratic in their use of exactions.96 Nollan and Dolan thus
had no single effect. Regulatory agencies varied in the ways in
which they incorporated or ignored them in practice.97
This suggests that except around the margins, Koontz is not
likely to cause any radical change to regulatory practice. The hallmarks of Nollan and Dolan—wide variability and a turn towards regulatory formulas and bureaucratic caution at the agency level, 98 and
increased state and local legislation to limit regulatory abuse99—will
continue. Indeed, in 2004, Florida by statute and regulation established formal regulatory formulas for calculating, through quantitative and qualitative scoring, wetland impact and mitigation, precisely
the issue that the District sought to address informally in its dealings
with Koontz.100 Other agencies will quite rationally stop or at least
95

Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 661-65 (2004) [hereinafter Fenster, Takings Formalism].
96
DANIEL POLLAK, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, HAVE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S 5TH
AMENDMENT TAKINGS DECISIONS CHANGED LAND USE P LANNING IN CALIFORNIA? 33-34, 83
(2000).
97
Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 95, at 652-68.
98
Id. at 642-48.
99
Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 12, at 759-60.
100
See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-345.100 (2013) (seeking to establish “a standardized
procedure for assessing the functions provided by wetlands and other surface waters, the
amount that those functions are reduced by a proposed impact, and the amount of mitigation
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limit negotiations and informal conversations with property owners
about possible mitigation measures; still others will increase the
amount of bureaucratic red tape they impose before placing conditions on development in order to establish, early in the approval process, Nollan and Dolan compliance; and many will know that they
can always simply deny a permit application and face lower constitutional scrutiny than if they discuss conditioning its issuance with the
property owner.101 Koontz’s practical effects, then, will not necessarily help property owners—it may protect them in some places, but
it likely will not in others—and will merely continue and expand the
dynamics at work for decades.102
Koontz’s subtle but real doctrinal effects, however, could augur significant changes in the Court’s exactions doctrine and in litigation. It is here, and especially in providing a remedy, that courts will
have to reckon with the Court’s newly emerged understanding of
Nollan and Dolan as unconstitutional conditions cases—which is to
say, as a line of cases that rely more on the logic of substantive due
process than on the text of the Takings Clause and the regulatory takings doctrine that the Court has established since deciding Penn Central.

necessary to offset that loss” in order to execute FLA. STAT. § 373.414(18) (2012)); see generally Memorandum from Jeff Littlejohn, Deputy Sec’y for Regulatory Programs, Fla. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot., on Interpreting and Applying the Unif. Mitigation Assessment Method (June
15, 2011) (on file with the Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.), available at
http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/watman/files/007_umam_guidance_061511.pdf (providing general guidance for how regulators must “score” impact and mitigation under the Uniform Mitigation Assessment Method); Bonnie Malloy, Symbolic Gestures or Our Saving
Grace: The Relevance of Compensatory Mitigation for Florida’s Wetlands in the Climate
Change Era, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 103, 125-26 (2011) (describing history of UMAM
and regulatory processes that follow it).
101
See Echeverria, supra note 9, at 2.
102
See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 95, at 653.
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